debtor-in-possession to expeditiously sell estate assets for the highest available price early in the process and to resolve most controversies at a later date. 8 The overriding concept is to allow the debtor-in-possession to convert distressed properties into liquid assets quickly and distribute them to the estate's creditors through a confirmed plan. 9 Today, the vast majority of large, Chapter 11 cases involve the sale of all or a part of those companies through the Quick Sale process. 10 There are sharp divisions among bankruptcy scholars as to whether the increased use of Quick Sales heralds "The End of Bankruptcy," 11 but it is undisputed that such sales occur more frequently than ever before; as many as two-thirds of all large bankruptcy cases now involve a Quick Sale. 12 However, instead of injecting itself into the debate about whether Quick Sales are desirable or appropriate, this Article takes as its starting point that such sales occur regularly and have become increasingly important. 13 Instead, this Article focuses on, and seeks to improve, the procedure by which Quick Sales occur.
An apparent tension exists, however, between § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 7001(2) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP). Section 363(b) allows a debtor to sell property of the estate by filing a sale 13. See Lubben, supra note 12, at 840; see also Rose, supra note 11, at 250 (claiming that the current rules governing the approval of § 363 sales are "grossly insufficient"). motion with the court. 14 Motion practice is an expeditious procedural mechanism and, by allowing Quick Sales to proceed by motion, Congress evidenced its recognition that Quick Sales sometimes need to occur rapidly. 15 By contrast, FRBP 7001(2) requires a debtor-in-possession to initiate a trial-like procedure-known as an adversary proceeding-in order to "determine the validity, priority, or extent of [an] interest in property." 16 Parties-in-interest have seized on this tension to assert that, if they claim some interest in the property to be sold, the debtor cannot sell that property until an adversary proceeding determines the extent of their interest. 17 However, these objections are sometimes raised for purely strategic reasons by parties without an interest in seeing the debtor successfully reorganize and, for the reasons discussed below, these objections rarely require the court to substantially delay a Quick Sale. 18 Unfortunately, courts differ when confronted on whether to require an ex ante adversary proceeding before approving a Quick Sale. 19 Strategic objections can cause substantial inefficiencies in a Quick Sale case. 20 Strategic objections are a serious concern, particularly when the objecting party bears little of the downside risk if its objection destroys the debtor-in-possession's ability to reorganize. Not only is delay potentially expensive, it is also unjustified in many cases. Consequently, the Bankruptcy Code contemplates that courts need not resolve most objections to bankruptcy sales before the sale is approved. 21 This Article is concerned primarily with instances where an objecting party seeks to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis the debtor by raising the specter of delay, rather than vindicating a right or interest provided by the bankruptcy laws. Strategic objections are troublesome because even a brief delay in consummating a Quick Sale may destroy a tremendous amount of value for the estate's creditors as a whole or can force a company to liquidate 22 instead of allowing it to reorganize. 23 At times, it may be difficult to distinguish between legitimate objections and strategic objections because the differences often relate to the objecting parties' subjective intent. 24 The ideal solution, therefore, does not require a bankruptcy judge to attempt to decipher the subjective intent of objecting parties. Rather, the ideal solution can be applied in all circumstances and filters out strategic objections while giving due consideration to legitimate objections.
The current situation is far from ideal and is due, in part, to § 363(f) being one of the most frequently misconstrued Bankruptcy Code provisions. 25 Although courts generally require debtors-in-possession to make, at minimum, 47, 90 (1993-1994) (noting that, in some instances, sales may need to occur before the court resolves objections).
22. See Baird, supra note 1, at 10 (finding that liquidation causes a realization of only ten percent of the company's book value).
23. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1997) , reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 (stating that parties traditionally view reorganizations as superior to liquidation because assets are more valuable when used in their corresponding industries than when sold for scrap); see also Rose, supra note 11, at 271 (arguing that the fundamental policy of preserving business value is implicit in Chapter 11 bankruptcy). A Quick Sale may allow a debtor to capture most or all of the value that would occur in a reorganization because it permits the debtor to sell to a buyer who values the debtor's assets as a going concern, rather than merely for their liquidation value. See William T. Bodoh on the merits and (2) the amount of irreparable harm that each side will suffer in the event the court acts on merits that later prove to be false. 33 Following these determinations, the court should multiply the expected loss and the likelihood of success on the merits, and then adopt the course of action suggesting the smaller probable loss. 34 This solution differs from many of the current approaches by placing the burden on the objecting party to demonstrate why a Quick Sale should be delayed (instead of requiring the debtor to show why it should be approved), thereby filtering out many strategic objections and ensuring that legitimate objections receive the degree of procedural protection that they are entitled to receive. Moreover, adopting a preliminary injunction standard for evaluating the merits of Quick Sale objections should deter parties-in-interest from attempting to muddle the sale process. 35 Part I of this Article provides an overview of the Quick Sale process and explains why bankruptcy sales often must be concluded rapidly if they are to benefit the estate. Part II provides a brief overview of the two primary procedural tracks on which most bankruptcy matters proceed. Part II also explains why Quick Sales were designed to be resolved through the more expeditious procedural track, known as a "contested matter," and why pushing Quick Sales onto the slower procedural track, known as an "adversary proceeding," is generally unnecessary or inappropriate. Part III analyzes several cases involving objections to Quick Sales and concludes that the current, muddled regime for analyzing Quick Sales increases the risk of strategic behavior. Part IV then suggests a formulation of the preliminary injunction standard advocated by Judge Richard Posner and Professor Leubsdorf is the appropriate standard to use when evaluating objections to Quick Sales because it is capable of filtering out or preventing strategic objections without harming parties with legitimate objections.
I. HOW BANKRUPTCY SALES WORK
Sections 1123(b)(4) and 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provide independent bases for a trustee 36 to sell property of the bankruptcy 33. See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at 594; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 541-42. This iteration of the preliminary injunction standard differs from the traditional formulation; however, its focus on error-minimization makes it ideal for the Quick Sale context. See infra Part IV (providing further discussion).
34. Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 542. 35. Id. at 565. 36. For the purposes of this Article, the term "trustee" refers to either a case trustee appointed by the court or a debtor-in-possession acting as a fiduciary for the estate's creditors who has all the rights and duties of a court-appointed trustee. The Bankruptcy Code generally allows the debtor in a Chapter 11 case to remain in possession and control of the estate's assets, and imposes a fiduciary duty on the debtor-in-possession to act at the behest of the estate's creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006); see also Schovanec, supra note 4, at 491 (outlining the powers entrusted to a trustee). 2) there is adequate notice to interested parties; (3) the price is fair and reasonable; and (4) the sale is conducted in good faith).
40. See Rose, supra note 11, at 249-50, 252-53 (concluding that a plain reading of the statute permits a sale of all or substantially all of a debtor's assets outside of a plan of reorganization and without complying with Chapter 11's "numerous and intricate requirements for plan confirmation"); see also Bodoh et al., supra note 23, at 4-5 (noting that the Second Circuit argued against the imposition of rigid rules for bankruptcy sales outside the ordinary course of business so long as there is an articulable business justification).
41. For example, the Second Circuit has stated that good business factors include: proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole, the amount of elapsed time since the filing, the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will be proposed and confirmed in the near future, the effect of the proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization, the proceeds to be obtained from the disposition vis-a-vis any appraisals notice be given, including full disclosure of the sale terms and any insider relationships; 42 (3) the sale price is fair and reasonable; 43 and (4) the proposed buyer proceed in good faith. 44 These requirements mirror the requirements to confirm a plan of reorganization. 45 Even so, Quick Sales are the preferred method of selling estate assets. 46 At times, debtors need to sell property of the estate very quickly to preserve the going-concern value of a business or deteriorating asset. In such cases, time is of the essence. This helps explain the preference for Quick Sales, which are "undeniably faster and less costly" than sales pursuant to a plan of reorganization. 47 of the property, which of the alternatives of use, sale or lease the proposal envisions and, . . . whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value. This point cannot be over-emphasized. A sale of assets may need to be consummated quickly because, among other possible reasons, the assets to be sold are deteriorating rapidly in value, 48 the only willing and available purchaser is unwilling to delay the sale, 49 because debtor-in-possession financing is about to run out and no further financing is available, 50 or, for reasons specific to the individual case, there is insufficient time to allow for conversion to and liquidation under Chapter 7.
51 If the trustee cannot complete the sale quickly, it may not occur at all or it may yield a significantly lower return to the estate, harming creditors in the process. 52 In some cases, the sale of assets is the only available source of cash to fund the debtor's ongoing operations, and the failure to consummate the sale may deprive the estate of necessary working capital. 53 If present, any of these concerns can threaten a debtor's ability to reorganize and leave the debtor-in-possession with no option but to liquidate estate assets at fire-sale prices. 54 In addition, Quick Sales allow the estate to sell assets at a price that, at least theoretically, takes into consideration the going-concern value of those assets. 55 The value of distressed companies often diminishes 54. See Baird, supra note 1, at 10 ("The rule of thumb when you liquidate a company is that you realize ten percent of book value.").
55. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527-28 (1984) (considering all parties involved when determining how best to preserve the going-concern of a debtor's assets); see also D'Antonio v. Bella Vista Assocs., LLC (In re Bella Vista Assocs., LLC), No. 2007 quickly as key employees leave, customers cease ordering, and accounts receivable become more difficult to collect. 56 In order to maximize the going-concern value of the assets (or company) to be sold, it is often necessary to complete a sale quickly.
57
Bankruptcy judges are attuned to a debtor-in-possession's need to act quickly and often approve Quick Sales in as little as sixty to ninety days. 58 Recognizing the need for speed, Congress enacted § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor-in-possession to expeditiously sell estate assets for the highest available price, and resolve controversies concerning the existence, validity, and priority of liens and other interests in the property to be sold at a later date. 59 Section 363(f) helps generate the highest possible price because it allows the debtor-in-possession to sell property of the estate free and clear of any interests in such property. 60 A free and clear sale is important to buyers who want to obtain clean title to the assets being sold-title that is unencumbered by potential liens or other claims of interest. 61 In turn, the ability to deliver an unencumbered title to property can allow the bankruptcy estate to generate a higher sale price, which maximizes the return to the estate's creditors. 62 These points help explain the preference 60. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) . Moreover, the debtor-in-possession "often has the specialized knowledge and industry contacts, through experience or previous efforts to solicit a buyer, necessary to sell the business in a manner that realizes an amount closer to the market value." Bodoh et al., supra note 23, at 12.
61. See Collen, supra note 25, at 564; see also Rose, supra note 11, at 259-60 (discussing the benefits for both debtors and asset purchasers of § 363(m) in providing finality to a § 363(b) sale).
62. See e.g., In re Oneida Lake, 114 B.R. at 356-58; see also Collen, supra note 25, at 564 (observing that avoiding liens can help the debtor realize the best sale price). [Vol. 62:1 for Quick Sales, which are "undeniably faster and less costly" than sales pursuant to a plan of reorganization. 63 Section 363(f) is a key statutory base for approving Quick Sales. Section 363(f)(4) provides that a debtor-in-possession may sell property of the estate "free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if . . . such interest is in bona fide dispute." 64 This language furthers one of the goals of § 363(f), which is to allow "the sale of property subject to dispute 'so that liquidation of the estate's assets need not be delayed while such disputes are being litigated.'" 65 Thus, this provision allows the expeditious sale of assets even when ownership is disputed.
In order to qualify for the protection afforded by § 363(f)(4), courts should require only that the debtor-in-possession demonstrate that "there is an objective basis for either a factual or legal dispute as to the validity of the asserted interest."
66 This is a low threshold and should not require a court to resolve the underlying dispute or determine the probable outcome; instead, it must only determine that a dispute exists. 67 Importantly, a "free and clear" Quick Sale allows a debtor-in-possession to return an asset quickly to productive use while ensuring a party's interests that property is adequately R. at 507 (holding that the trustee has the burden to prove the existence of a bona fide dispute); Kuney, supra note 28, at 247 n.44 (noting that most courts consider whether a "bona fide dispute" exists under the objective test and "that the 'subjective' test of In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 49 B.R. 823 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) has been largely discarded.").
67. In re Downour, 2007 WL 963258, at *1. Courts generally have not required a party to commence an action, but merely require that a debtor-in-possession make a prima facie showing that a dispute exists and that such dispute could be meritorious. See In re Gaylord Grain, 306 B.R. at 628; see also In re DVI, Inc., 306 B.R. 496, 503-04 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (holding that even if the debtor arguably held the creditor's property in constructive trust, the existence of a bona fide dispute permits the property to be sold under § 363(f)(4)); In re Oneida Lake 114 B.R. at 358 (holding that § 363(f)(4) is satisfied "even though the Debtor has not as yet commenced the adversary proceeding" to avoid the creditor's lien); Collen, supra note 25, at 574-75 ("[O]nce a party states that it disputes a lien, it follows tautologically that the lien is 'in dispute.'").
protected. 68 By quickly returning assets to productive use, Quick Sales provide both a social and a private benefit. 69 Unfortunately, courts have often misconstrued § 363(f). 70 For example, courts have disagreed as to whether a dispute as to ownership can qualify as a bona fide dispute within the meaning of § 363(f)(4) and whether the dispute must relate to the "validity or existence of an interest" or only to the amount of the lien or other claimed interest. 71 As a result, courts sometimes allow such disputes to delay Quick Sales. 72 The reason that courts misconstrue § 363(f) so frequently is not because confusion exists about whether an ownership dispute can qualify as a bona fide dispute within the meaning of § 363(f)(4), but whether the courts can resolve ownership disputes within the contested-matter framework at all. 73 The ability to rapidly conclude an asset sale enables a debtor-in-possession with limited resources to sell its business as a going concern and thereby preserve value. 74 Quick Sales are often more advantageous vehicles for debtors-in-possession seeking to sell estate assets than sales consummated pursuant to a plan of reorganization. 75 One chief advantage is that, after providing the requisite notice and opportunity for a hearing, these out-of-plan sales require only court approval to proceed, rather than going through the more time-consuming plan confirmation process. 76 Because plan confirmation is not required for a Quick Sale, a court can often complete Quick Sales in less than sixty days. 77 68. See Kuney, supra note 28, at 248. 69. Id. "Free and clear" sales are "an expeditious method to clear title to a disputed asset" that provide a social benefit through economic efficiency without material harm to property owners because sale orders generally provide for replacement liens on the proceeds of the sale.
Id.
70 The vast majority of bankruptcy litigation, including contested Quick Sales, occurs within the expeditious contested-matter procedural framework. 79 In contrast to adversary proceedings, which are similar to civil actions in federal district court and require the filing of a complaint, answer, counterclaim, crossclaim, and third-party practice, 80 the contested-matter procedural framework dispenses with such requirements in favor of a simple motion procedure. 81 Under the contested-matter procedural framework, notice of a Quick Sale need only be given twenty-one days before a hearing and, if no objection is received, the court may enter an order approving the sale without a hearing. 82 In appropriate cases, the bankruptcy court may shorten this already brief notice period even further. 79. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 advisory committee's note ("Whenever there is an actual dispute, other than an adversary proceeding, before the bankruptcy court, the litigation to resolve that dispute is a contested matter."); Klein, supra note 78, at 39 (arguing that contested matters are, "by a wide margin, the most common form of bankruptcy litigation"); Robert W. Lawless, Realigning the Theory and Practice of Notice in Bankruptcy Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215, 1272 (1994) ("The bankruptcy rules require that a debtor move for a 'free and clear' sale as a contested matter.").
80. SLW Capital, LLC v. Janica Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) ("An adversary proceeding is essentially a self-contained trial-still within the original bankruptcy case-in which a panoply of additional procedures apply."). An adversary proceeding employs essentially the same rules of procedure as a federal civil action, but it is tried in the federal bankruptcy court instead. Klein, supra note 78, at 38. Like a federal civil case, the filing of a complaint and serving of a summons, which defendants must answer, initiates adversary proceedings. The contested-matter framework offers a more streamlined process compared to the adversary proceeding framework. 84 For example, Professors Douglas Baird and Edward Morrison found that the average length of an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois-from time of filing until resolution-has varied from about ten months in 1993 to about seven-and-a-half months in 2002. 85 In contrast, courts almost always resolve contested matters more expeditiously and at a lower cost. 86 The differences are stark. As such, bankruptcy courts should carefully scrutinize attempts by creditors to force any matter out of the contested-matter framework and into the adversary proceeding framework.
A company's size or the nature of the assets being sold does not determine the choice of whether to proceed along the fast or slow tracks. Even very large companies can be sold in "blindingly fast" fashion. 87 The debtor may even sell its entire business as a going concern.
88 One example, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., is one of the largest bankruptcy cases ever filed. In that case, the debtors filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, listing assets in excess of $630 billion. 89 Within one week, Barclays purchased substantially all of the debtors' assets and most of its liabilities. 90 The Lehman estate and Barclays subsequently litigated a number of issues, but the sale was not delayed while the numerous points of contention were concluded in a separate adversary proceeding. 92 Parties-in-interest have seized on the apparent tensions between the Code and the FRBP to assert that the property cannot be sold until the debtor's interest in it is determined in an adversary proceeding. 93 Some courts have found such arguments persuasive. 94 These courts have refused to approve Quick Sales until the debtor has proven that the property to be sold is "property of the estate." 95 Courts that have halted the Quick Sale process to require adversary proceedings have typically done so because they believe FRBP 7001(2) requires that an adversary proceeding be commenced to "determine the validity, priority, or extent of [an] interest in property."
96 Such courts are correct that FRBP 7001(2) requires an adversary proceeding, but they are incorrect as to when the determination of the extent of the debtor's interest must occur.
97
The determination may, but need not, precede the consummation of a Quick Sale, particularly when the failure to sell estate assets quickly may have significant deleterious effects on the estate and its creditors.
98
Such courts appear to take an unduly narrow view of when ownership interests may be resolved.
99
Rather than requiring a pre-sale adversary proceeding to resolve such objections, courts should consider, as some already do, the question of what constitutes "property of the estate" as a "threshold question," which may be addressed within the contested-matter procedural framework. Additionally, a prior determination of the "validity, priority, or extent" of the estate's interest in property is unnecessary in the Quick Sale context because § 363(e) requires interested parties in a Quick Sale be provided "adequate protection."
104 By providing an objecting party with adequate protection, the debtor protects that party in the event that the court later determines that the objecting party had some interest in the property that was sold. Even though a Quick Sale does not fully and finally determine the "validity, priority, or extent of [that] interest in property," providing adequate protection ensures that the objecting party will be minimally affected by a Quick Sale.
105 Therefore, a pre-sale adversary proceeding is not required when an objecting party has received adequate protection. 106 In addition, § 363(b) itself further undermines the supposed need for a pre-sale proceeding by allowing the debtor to sell "property of the estate" by motion. the courts required a debtor-in-possession to initiate an adversary proceeding to resolve every objection to the sale.
III. OBJECTIONS TO QUICK SALES
Bankruptcy laws attempt to balance the numerous competing interests and policy objectives that exist in large corporate bankruptcy cases. 108 A common result is that certain sections of the Bankruptcy Code and the FRBP consider how to harmonize competing demands within the context of a particular case. Bankruptcy courts repeatedly confront the tension between promoting expeditious resolution of cases and providing sufficient procedural protections to parties. For example, § 363 and case law interpreting that section demonstrate that bankruptcy courts are concerned with maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate by quickly converting distressed estate assets into a readily distributable fund for creditors; however, they are also tasked with ensuring that all affected parties-in-interest receive adequate procedural protection for their legitimate interests in the Quick Sale. 109 The twin goals of § 363 often appear to suggest different courses of action.
Sales concluded pursuant to a plan of reorganization are often too slow to respond to the business realities of many situations because of the lengthy delays inherent in the process of plan confirmation itself. 110 The length of the process does not generally relate to the sale of assets. The plan confirmation process is long because of the procedural requirements, such as soliciting votes on a plan of reorganization 111 and plan confirmation hearings.
112
Section 363 sales require none of these delays. The ability to rapidly conclude a sale is one of the reasons Quick Sales have become so popular in recent years. 113 Debtors frequently suggest that it is imperative for the 108. See Lawless, supra note 79, at 1216 (noting the unique power of bankruptcy courts to bind disparate interests).
109. The bankruptcy laws are not necessarily equivalent to constitutional requirements. Sometimes they provide more than is required and, at other times, they fail to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Compare United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378 (2010) (concluding that actual notice, even absent service of a summons and a complaint, satisfied due process), with Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011) (finding that the bankruptcy court exceeded its constitutional authority when it issued a final judgment on a "noncore" proceeding).
110. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 461-62 (noting that the plan confirmation process may span several years); see also Uziel, supra note 76, at 1191 (suggesting that Quick Sales are streamlined because they avoid confirmation by various creditors).
111 bankruptcy courts to sell some or all of their assets quickly 114 and they have often succeeded in convincing courts to approve a Quick Sale by likening their assets to a "melting ice cube" and claiming there was "no time to spare" in approving a sale of the estate's assets. 115 However, even if there is "no time to spare," it is always the case that courts must afford parties-in-interest the procedural protections necessary to safeguard their legitimate rights.
116
At a minimum, due process requires affording parties-in-interest notice of the proposed sale and the opportunity to be heard. 117 Further protection may also be warranted, such as closely scrutinizing the proffered "business judgment" of the debtor-in-possession or loosening restrictions found in bid-procedure orders to encourage more robust bidding. 118 However, affording parties-in-interest the appropriate degree of procedural protection should not usually require debtors to initiate an adversary proceeding in order to complete a Quick Sale.
A. Objections Other than Those Requesting an Adversary Proceeding
Generally, objections that can be resolved within the contested-matter procedural framework are less troublesome because they are less likely to cause significant delay.
119 Thus, they are usually not objections made for strategic purposes. For example, parties-in-interest might object to a sale because they believe that the procedures for bidding on the estate's assets are REV They might also object because the proposed purchase price for the assets or the price they are expected to fetch at auction is too low. 121 It is also common for parties-in-interest to object to a Quick Sale claiming that a secured creditor is attempting to force through a sale too quickly and that a more fulsome (and longer) process would serve to maximize value for the estate.
122 Unsecured or subordinated creditors commonly assert that the secured creditors are pressuring the debtor to accept the first offer that exceeds the amount the secured creditors are owed, even though that offer is below the assets' "true value," thereby limiting the recovery of subordinate creditors. 123 Standard bid and sale procedure orders already provide creditors substantial protection and are approved almost universally in Quick Sale cases.
124 Typical orders require the identification of an initial "stalking horse" bidder and provide for the solicitation of competing bids and a public auction. 125 To encourage the initial bidder to invest sufficient energy and resources to make the highest possible bid for the debtor's assets, bid-procedure orders usually allow the debtor-in-possession to pay the reasonable expenses of the stalking horse in formulating its initial bid. 126 As an added incentive, bid-procedure orders commonly provide for the payment of a break-up fee of between one and three percent of the purchase price in the event that an alternative bidder wins at auction. 127 Other common provisions include overbid requirements, minimum bid increments, and a requirement that all bids conform to the initial bid. 128 In addition to protecting the stalking horse, however, these provisions can potentially chill bidding because they require any alternative bidders to top the stalking horse's bid by at least those amounts. 129 Therefore, a common solution to sale objections of the sort mentioned above is to weaken the protections offered to the stalking horse bidder. 130 Nevertheless, where the estate's assets have been marketed sufficiently, appropriate bid protections can provide assurance to the bankruptcy judge that enough was done to achieve the best price.
131 If the assets have not been marketed sufficiently, the court may need to delay an auction to generate sufficient interest in the assets and ensure that the debtor obtains the best available price for its assets.
132
By eliminating overbid requirements and other assorted bid protections, a bid-procedure order can be sufficiently modified to encourage more active bidding for the estate's assets. 133 In addition, such orders often provide creditors with the ability to credit bid 134 or to submit competing bids. 135 When coupled with an aggressive and extensive pre-sale marketing campaign, such efforts are generally found sufficient to establish that the debtor has obtained the best available price for its assets.
136 Such efforts may also be sufficient to Therefore, instead of delaying the sale, the most common type of Quick Sale objections can be resolved appropriately by modifying the bid-procedure order to encourage more active bidding, which helps to ensure that the assets are sold for their market value.
138
A common variation on the objection that secured creditors are attempting to rush through a sale at below-market prices is a parties-in-interest's claim that the value of the estate would be maximized by selling the property at a later date, when, for example, the market for the asset to be sold has improved. 139 Objectors often suggest that the debtor is being shortsighted by not waiting for that improvement to occur.
140
These objections are often grounded in the perception that the secured creditors have too much influence over the debtor. 141 Indeed, secured creditors often do hold significant sway over a debtor, particularly if they have provided the debtor-in-possession financing on which the debtor is relying or if they have liens on the debtor's cash collateral. 142 And it may be true that a Quick Sale will be detrimental to the junior parties, but it is unclear that better options are available.
143
As noted above, when cash begins to run short, the most important issue is whether the debtor can afford to delay and who should fund any ongoing losses during that delay. 144 As a practical matter, a business that hopes to take advantage of its going-concern value needs to remain a going concern. The business needs to fund the expenses forcontinuing its operations, and will normally need to use its cash collateral to do so. A debtor's cash reserves are ) (asserting that the debtors were "selling their assets at an inopportune time" because they were motivated by the "improper purpose of securing tax benefits for a non-Debtor parent entity").
140. See, e.g., id. at 328 n.24 (providing reasons why the sale should be delayed). 141. See Baird, supra note 1, at 25 (describing the control the secured creditor has in such situations).
142. Id. at 18-19. The days in which the "old managers of a financially distressed business called the shots" is long past. Id. at 18. These days, "secured creditors begin to control the governance of the business" well in advance of any bankruptcy filing. Id. at 18-19 (citing "a growing body of empirical work on this issue").
143. Id. at 19. The costs of a sale at fire-prices are borne by the junior investors; however, because secured creditors bear the risk of asset depreciation caused by delay, it is not clear that a court should prefer the junior creditors' interests over those of senior creditors. See Baird, supra note 1, at 19.
144. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 8; see also In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that one factor in whether to approve a Quick Sale is whether there is material risk that by deferring the sale, "the patient will die on the operating table").
normally subject to its senior lenders' security interests, and the Bankruptcy Code severely limits a judge's ability to authorize the use of encumbered cash without the secured creditors' consent.
145 Sophisticated secured creditors often refuse to consent unless the bankruptcy judge approves a proposed Quick Sale on the secured creditors' terms.
146 It may simply be impossible to devise procedures that adequately protect the secured creditors' priority position and their right to control the use of their collateral, while also protecting the junior creditors' position by ensuring that estate assets are sold for the highest theoretically available price.
147

B. Objections That the Property To Be Sold Is Not "Property of the Estate"
The most potent objection to a sale is that the property to be sold is not "property of the estate." In other words, the objecting party may claim that the property is not the debtor's to sell. These objections are potentially potent because objectors usually urge the court to require the debtor-in-possession to commence a pre-sale adversary proceeding to determine the extent of the estate's interest, if any, in the property to be sold. 148 Objections of this sort seek to convince the court to move the Quick Sale from the expedient procedures that accompany contested matters to stop allowing the debtor to use the expedient procedures that accompany contested matters and instead use the more cumbersome adversary proceeding track. 149 These objections threaten to delay the sale while ownership issues are litigated in an adversary proceeding, which can potentially impose tremendous costs on other creditors of the estate. 146. See Baird, supra note 1, at 19-20 (asserting that judges prefer this rather than having the case "explode into thousands of contentious lawsuits over the wreckage that follows in the wake of a piecemeal liquidation").
147. See Id. at 20 (discussing the importance of protecting the junior investors while ensuring that the senior creditors are paid in full); see also In re Gen. Motors, 407 B.R. at 490 (noting that a Quick Sale may be appropriate where: (1) the estate lacks the liquidity to survive until plan confirmation; (2) the sale opportunity may not still exist at the time of plan confirmation and a satisfactory alternative sale opportunity or stand-alone plan alternative that is equally desirable may be unavailable; and (3) there is "a material risk that by deferring the sale, the patient will die on the operating table"). 150. In re Whitehall Jewelers, 2008 WL 2951974, at *7 (noting that the debtors would need to commence more than 120 adversary proceedings in order to resolve ownership claims involving the disputed property).
If an estate's assets are deteriorating rapidly in value, the mere threat of delay can be powerful because even a minor delay can jeopardize a tremendous amount of value for the estate's other creditors. 151 For example, if the debtor has obtained only enough debtor-in-possession financing to conclude a relatively expedient sale process, a short delay could jeopardize the debtor's ability to reorganize.
152 A debtor-in-possession lender demanding the debtor conclude an asset sale on an aggressive timeline is unlikely to fund ongoing (and often money-losing) operations while the debtor resolves the ownership claims of third-parties in an adversary proceeding.
153
And even if a debtor-in-possession was willing to extend additional funds, the lender is normally entitled to repayment of those sums ahead of other creditors of the estate. 154 Given the foregoing, it is a significant cause for concern that the bankruptcy courts sometimes allow creditors to delay the Quick Sale process.
155
In some cases-even after the debtor made a prima facie 156 showing that the property is property of the estate-courts have refused to approve the Quick Sale. 157 In other cases, despite the existence of a bona fide dispute within the meaning of § 363(f)(4), some courts have delayed a Quick Sale and forced the debtor-in-possession to initiate multiple adversary proceedings to resolve the disputed ownership claims before the sale. 158 Yet, on similar facts, courts have 152. Id. (noting that an immediate sale opens up funds for reorganization); see also AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (noting that some businesses may shut-down if they are delayed in selling assets).
153. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. In the recent economic downturn in the United States, debtor-in-possession financing became noticeably more difficult to obtain, and, even where it was available, the lender often used "the provision of DIP financing to influence the timeline and outcome of the [C]hapter 11 case." Id. often approved Quick Sales. 159 When courts have approved the sale, it was typically based on the recognition that a delayed sale would irreparably harm creditors. 160 For instance, in In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., the bankruptcy court approved the sale of hundreds of parcels of real property free and clear of all liens, claims, and interests despite the objections of several creditors who claimed to be the record title owners of certain parcels that were slated to be sold. 161 The court determined that "the mere fact that title to a property is in the name of an investor does not mean that [the debtor] does not have an equitable interest in the property." 162 Because the trustee made a prima facie showing of ownership, the court refused to halt the sale while ownership rights were resolved in an adversary proceeding, despite colorable claims of ownership by the objecting parties. 163 The court asserted that it was neither workable nor necessary to permit discovery and hold hearings with respect to the disputed properties in the time available before the sale. 164 When courts refuse to approve a Quick Sale even after a prima facie showing that the property to be sold belongs to the estate, which satisfies § 363(f)'s requirement that a bona fide dispute exists, they allow objecting parties to unnecessarily and inappropriately derail the Quick Sale process. And they do so based on a limited showing that there is some hypothetical issue that could harm the objecting party. 165 decision to approve a Quick Sale of real property through a grant deed, 166 despite the bankruptcy court's finding that the debtor had at least "some interest in the property," and the purchaser had taken "the entire risk that the estate did not have good title-or, for that matter, any title." 167 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed because: (1) it would be incongruous to grant the sale motion while an adversary proceeding determining the full extent of the parties' ownership rights was already pending; and (2) it avoided piecemeal litigation by determining ownership of property before allowing the sale. 168 The court suggested that it "must seek to promote consistent and unfragmented decision-making when faced with the need to determine predicate issues such as property ownership in the Section 363 context." 169 Thus, despite the prior determination that the debtor had at least some interest in the property to be sold, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel halted the sale of the debtor's interests until the parties resolved their ownership dispute over the property.
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Like the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Popp, the Third Circuit-one of the most influential circuits for bankruptcy cases-has adopted a creditor-friendly reading of FRBP 7001(2). 171 In In re Mansaray-Ruffin, a divided Third Circuit panel appeared to adopt a per se rule that prevents the sale of property pursuant to § 363 without a prior determination of whether the property to be sold is property of the estate. 172 This appears to be a somewhat novel reading 173 The ad hoc, case-by-case approach that courts have taken on this issue creates unpredictability and encourages costly and time-consuming litigation. The ambiguity caused by this ad hoc approach creates openings for parties to raise strategic objections. Courts need to adopt a systemic approach that employs a clear, uniform, and strict standard in order to reduce the number of strategic objections.
C. Decreasing the Risk of Gamesmanship
Although some Quick Sale objections are legitimate, parties-in-interest sometimes object with the intent of delaying the sale in order to improve their bargaining position. 176 These strategic attempts to extort a delay-avoidance presumably are an important reason why bankruptcy courts should carefully scrutinize all Quick Sale objections and, whenever possible, reserve litigation until after the sale. Although judges should employ their sound judicial wisdom to ferret out strategic objections, they should not be the sole line of defense against such gambits. Unless courts adopt systemic rules to prevent attempts to extract payments outside the normally applicable rules, parties-ininterest will continue raising the specter of delay in an attempt to extract extralegal payments. The current system implicitly encourages strategic objections. For example, in In re Eclipse Aviation Corp., an ad hoc group of depositors (the Objecting Parties) objected to the debtors' attempt to sell partially completed aircraft because they argued the aircraft were not property of the estate and could not be sold under § 363(f). 178 The Objecting Parties asserted that they were the aircraft's owners. 179 However, the aircraft in question were still on the assembly line and, in most cases, were not even completely built, let alone airworthy. 180 The aircraft had very little value unless they could be completed and FAA certifications were obtained. 181 The only party who appeared able to do so was the potential purchaser. 182 Selling the aircraft at auction with the rest of the debtors' assets would preserve the debtors' going-concern value and appeared to be the only way to maximize value for all creditors, including the Objecting Parties. 183 Rather than attempting to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of all creditors, the Objecting Parties appeared to be maneuvering to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the debtors by contesting the debtors' right to sell "their" aircraft.
Ultimately, the court refused to allow the Objecting Parties to derail the sale. 184 The court required only that replacement liens would attach to the proceeds of the sale and the parties could litigate over the proceeds at a later date, 185 recognizing that a delayed sale was in no one's interest and that the Objecting Parties' asserted interests could be adequately protected. 186 Because there has been no systemic approach for resolving Quick Sale objections, the Bankruptcy courts should view objections that the property to be sold is not "property of the estate" skeptically, because such objections are sometimes made strategically. More importantly though, courts should impose a uniform standard with a high bar for Quick Sale objections. Setting a high threshold for objections would encourage parties to carefully consider whether they should seek such relief in the first instance.
188 If parties-in-interest choose not to commence such actions, the burdens on the judiciary will be reduced, increasing access to justice for parties with colorable arguments. 189 Unless bankruptcy courts impose a high burden on parties-in-interest who make Quick Sale objections, the courts will continue to implicitly encourage specious arguments and frivolous, vexatious litigation. The solution advocated in this Article should reduce the risk of gamesmanship by discouraging parties-in-interest from bringing frivolous litigation because courts that follow the proposed standard will make it clear that specious objections are unlikely to succeed.
The Bankruptcy Code suggests that Quick Sales should occur within the expedient contested-matter procedural framework.
190 Some courts have balked at making the necessary threshold determinations without the additional procedural protections that are generally available in an adversary proceeding, but this reaction is an error. 191 Although the term "property of the estate" appears to require some sort of "antecedent determination of property 187. FRBP 9011(a)(1) is also a possible mechanism for handling strategic objectors, which requires objections to "not be[] presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." FRBP 9011(a)(2) requires that all "claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law." Although FRBP 9011 sanctions may be appropriate in particularly egregious cases, they are an ex post solution that relies on deterrence to create ex ante compliance. interests," 192 such determinations need not fully and finally resolve the issue. In such cases, adversary proceedings are not required. Rather, whether the property "is or could become property of the bankruptcy estate" requires only a "threshold determination." 193 Given the foregoing, it appears that § 363(f) provides the statutory authority justifying the imposition of a preliminary injunction standard on challenges to the estate's authority to seek a Quick Sale.
IV. RAISING THE BAR FOR QUICK SALE OBJECTIONS
Given the competing policy objections implicit in the bankruptcy laws, it is unsurprising that judges often emphasize one policy goal over another in their decisions. 194 However, when Quick Sales are unnecessarily delayed, the delay can jeopardize a significant amount of value for creditors. 195 Additionally, the unpredictability created by the current ad hoc, case-by-case approach creates uncertainty, inefficiency, and encourages creditors to engage in gamesmanship.
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A systemic approach is needed. It would increase predictability while decreasing the type of costly and time-consuming litigation that the current approaches have created. 197 Finally, clarity in this area should decrease the incidence of gamesmanship by parties-in-interest.
The appropriate standard should balance the need to provide sufficient procedural protection to creditors while allowing Quick Sales to proceed along the expeditious track that Congress intended for them. 198 This Article suggests that the appropriate balance in most cases is achievable by requiring objecting parties to meet a preliminary injunction standard in order to move Quick Sales from the expedient procedural track onto the cumbersome adversary proceeding track.
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Imposing the suggested standard would also help to effectuate Congress' intention for § 363(f), which is to promote the "alienability of property of the estate right up to the constitutional limit of the Fifth Amendment's 'takings' clause, regardless of whoever else may have an interest in that property." 200 In addition to representing a "pragmatic and realistic" approach to problems inherent in Quick Sales and promoting the free alienability of property, imposing the suggested standard ought to provide sufficient procedural protection for parties-in-interest. 201 Although there are a "dizzying diversity of formulations" of the preliminary injunction requirements, 202 courts have traditionally required a party seeking a preliminary injunction to demonstrate: (1) a probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) that the balance of harms favors the party seeking the injunction; and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest, where applicable. 203 Various courts have stated the test differently and some combine the second and third inquiries. 204 In every case, the burden of establishing an entitlement to the preliminary injunction rests with the party seeking that injunction. 205 In part, the traditional test was said to have been formulated in an attempt to preserve the status quo until a full and final determination of the merits of the underlying case could occur. 206 
A. Why a Preliminary Injunction Standard?
A preliminary injunction standard is appropriate for Quick Sale objections that claim the property to be sold is not property of the estate because of the similarities between the two contexts in which courts make these decisions. In both sale objections and preliminary injunction hearings, the initial hearing will occur based on a limited evidentiary record. In the Quick Sale context, a bankruptcy court need only determine that the property to be sold is or could become property of the estate. 207 This is a "threshold inquiry," similar to the types of matters heard on a traditional motion for a preliminary injunction, whereby a party seeks an initial determination as to their likelihood of success on the merits, the amount of irreparable harm they might suffer, the effect on the public interest, and the balance of harms between the parties. 208 Imposing a preliminary injunction standard will make it more difficult for objecting parties to delay Quick Sales and will therefore "promote the alienability of property," which promotes the policy objectives underlying § 363. 209 As suggested above, the expeditious resolution of disputes is an important function of the bankruptcy laws. 210 The bankruptcy laws are also concerned with ensuring that parties receive sufficient procedural protections. 211 In general, appropriate procedural protections include notice and the opportunity for a hearing before depriving a party of his or her use of the property. 212 Courts also recognize that, under appropriate circumstances, an after-the-fact hearing can be wholly sufficient to provide due process protections. 213 The Quick Sale context is one of those circumstances in which reserving a full and final decision for an after-the-fact hearing is appropriate, at least when a significant delay may threaten to destroy substantial value for the estate and its creditors and the objecting party receives adequate protection. 214 Due process requires nothing more. 215 Objections to Quick Sales often threaten to cause substantial harm to the debtor and to third-party creditors. In contrast, objecting parties rarely appear likely to suffer substantial, let alone irreparable, harm if a court allows a debtor-in-possession to sell assets pursuant to § 363(f) and the court later determines that the property that was sold was not property of the estate. 216 Courts generally require that "a plaintiff demonstrates a significant risk that he or she will experience harm that cannot adequately be remedied by monetary damages" in order to find the creditor would be irreparably harmed. 217 One reason irreparable harm is particularly difficult to demonstrate in bankruptcy cases is because the Bankruptcy Code requires that parties whose property is to be used or sold are provided with "adequate protection." 218 Because "the right to 'adequate protection' is the right to the preservation of the value of a lien throughout the bankruptcy proceedings," adequately protected parties are unlikely to be able to demonstrate irreparable harm. 219 The Bankruptcy Code does not limit the parties' imagination in determining how to adequately protect creditors' interests, but one of the most common methods is to grant the party with an interest in the property to be sold a "replacement lien" on sale proceeds. 220 In many cases, such as a claimed interest in a fungible commodity, an aggressively marketed public auction coupled with a lien on the proceeds of the sale generally ensures that the party with an interest in the property to be sold receives the benefit of its bargain. 221 Even in the case of real property, monetary relief may be sufficient to provide adequate compensation. 222 Thus, even the existence of a dispute over "unique" property will not always indicate that a Quick Sale should be delayed. 223 This is especially true if an objecting party can be granted some modified right to credit bid their claim at auction, or if the court can grant the objecting party a right of first refusal. 224 Courts may appropriately address these rights in a carefully worded adequate protection order.
B. The Leubsdorf-Posner Preliminary Injunction Standard Is Appropriate for Quick Sales
Professor John Leubsdorf offered one of the most cogent criticisms of the traditional standard in his seminal article, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions. 225 Leubsdorf suggests that the traditional standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction is wrong-headed in its focus on attempting to preserve the status quo. 226 Not only is it is often impossible to maintain the status quo, but determining what constitutes the status quo often involves drawing conclusions as to which party is correct. 227 In place of the traditional approach, Professor Leubsdorf suggests a revised formulation, which was subsequently championed by Judge Posner and adopted by the Seventh Circuit. 228 The Leubsdorf-Posner formulation of the preliminary injunction standard requires a court to make two inquiries: (1) the likelihood that each side will succeed on the merits at a full hearing; and (2) the amount of irreparable harm that each side will likely suffer in the event the court acts on a view of the merits that later proves to be incorrect. 229 The court should then multiply the expected loss by the likelihood of success on the merits. 230 The Leubsdorf-Posner formulation requires that courts should adopt whichever course of action suggests the smaller probable loss. 231 Thus, a party, moving or non-moving, that faces a large potential loss can prevail even if its chances of succeeding on the merits are not as strong as the other party's chances. By weighing the expected costs and the likelihood of success on the merits, the Leubsdorf-Posner formulation is designed "to minimize the expected financing is available, 238 or there is insufficient time to allow for conversion to and liquidation under Chapter 7. 239 By contrast, the objecting party is likely to make a more straightforward irreparable harm claim. 240 The objecting party is likely to argue that, because the property to be sold is not property of the estate, it will be deprived of due process if the debtor sells the property before the court makes a full and final determination regarding ownership. 241 In addition, the objecting party may also argue that the property to be sold is unique in some way and therefore monetary compensation is inadequate.
242
Such arguments should be examined closely and, in appropriate cases, may be sufficient to establish irreparable harm. For example, creditors who object to the sale of intellectual property may be able to demonstrate that they cannot be adequately protected by a lien on the proceeds of a sale. 243 Additionally, in cases where irreparable harm to both sides is possible, the decision to allow or not to allow the Quick Sale may necessarily lead to some loss. 244 One advantage of adapting the Leubsdorf-Posner formulation to Quick Sales, however, is that its goal is to "chart the course likely to inflict the smallest probable irreparable loss of rights." 245 Although a court should hesitate to deny an objecting party the right to an ex ante determination of its property rights, a court should also be equally hesitant to delay a Quick Sale and potentially inflict serious harm on third-party creditors when an objecting party cannot meet the Leubsdorf-Posner standard.
246 Imposing a clear, uniform, and strict standard on objecting parties would provide a benefit for all parties. It would increase the predictability and laws. A systemic approach to Quick Sale objections is the only appropriate remedy for the type of systemic problem identified by this Article.
It is problematic that some courts have denied debtors-in-possession the right to quickly sell estate assets, particularly when the delay has threatened or destroyed a debtor's ability to reorganize or unnecessarily destroyed value in the estate. In addition to preventing the estate from converting distressed assets expeditiously into either a fund for distribution to the estate's creditors or to a debtor's ongoing operations, the issues of when and in what type of proceeding to determine property interest have divided courts. This division creates unpredictability for all parties involved in Quick Sales. Adopting a preliminary injunction standard should rectify this problem going forward.
